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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, strong concern has been displayed over the status of the 
housing sector in the United States. As a result, this study has been 
undertaken to deal with one of the problems significant to that status. 
It is apparent that the mortgage credit market is important to the housing 
sector, since the terms and availability of mortgage credit have a direct 
bearing on user demand for housing accommodations (25). Therefore, the 
major concern in this study is not the housing sector per se, but how and 
to what degree the discretionary tools of monetary policy affect the terms 
and availability of mortgage credit, thus implying the influence of mone­
tary policy on the housing market. To present a study of this type, it is 
necessary to derive an econmnetric model of the mortgage credit market, 
consisting of functional relationships of the demand for and supply of 
mortgage credit. 
A comprehensive model of this type would be beyond the scope of the 
study presented here. The solution is to restrict the analysis to a 
specific area of the mortgage credit market. To accomplish this, the 
problem has been limited to isolating the effects of discretionary monetary 
policy on the demand for and supply of mortgage credit from the savings and 
loan associations (S & L's) for single-family, owner-occupied, convention­
ally financed homes. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. The second chapter is confined 
to developing the demand for conventional mortgage credit under the assump­
tion that the individual attempts to maximize his wealth. It is from the 
first order conditions of the Lagrangian expression of this constrained 
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maximum that the variables to be used in the demand function are determined. 
The third chapter deals with the formulation of the supply of conventional 
mortgage credit from a savings and loan association. Again, a constrained 
maximum, but of S & L profits, is used to deteirmine the supply function. A 
short note on the difficulties encountered in aggregating the model for em­
pirical analysis is included at the end of chapter three. Chapter four 
presents the formulation of an adjustment mechanism that will take into 
consideration the importance that demand plays in determining the equilib­
rium rate of interest on conventional mortgages. In chapter five, the 
channels of monetary policy are incorporated into the model. 
Monetary forces will be assumed.to operate in the mortgage credit mar­
ket through three channels. The channels are the cost-of-capital effect, 
the wealth effect, and credit rationing. Many econometric studies have 
taken into consideration only the cost-of-capital effect of monetary policy, 
thus often causing the results to be biased against monetary forces. This 
bias has caused concern, especially with respect to the housing sector, be­
cause even though these studies have failed to show the full impact of mone­
tary policy on the econcmy, the fluctuations that occur in the housing mar­
ket are often attributed to monetary forces (8). In an attempt to elimin­
ate this bias, the two additional channels of monetary policy will be in­
cluded in this model. 
The first channel of monetary policy, the cost-of-capital effect, has 
its impact on the buy-or-rent decision of firms and individuals. If the 
cost of owning capital is high relative to the cost of renting, then fewer 
units of capital are purchased. If the cost of owning capital is low rela­
tive to the cost of renting, the opposite is true. Therefore, the implicit 
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cost of owning capital is just as important as the explicit cost of renting 
capital when the decision to buy-or-rent capital services is made. For the 
purposes of this study, the cost-of-capital influences of monetary policy 
will be most directly related to the decision of the individual to buy-or-
rent housing services. 
The second channel of monetary policy is the wealth effect. This 
effect implies that as a result of monetary policy, the value of the assets 
held in the portfolios of individuals and financial intermediaries change. 
The change in the value of the assets will cause the wealth of the individ­
ual and the net worth of the firm to change, thus leading to changes in the 
consumption of goods and services, including the services provided by 
owner-occupied housing to the individual. 
With respect to the mortgage credit market, the third channel of 
monetary policy, credit rationing, suggests that nonprice rationing occurs 
when the rate of interest on mortgage credit is slow to adjust to the ex­
cess demand for mortgage credit that may exist as a result of monetary 
forces (6), (8), and (19). As a result, the credit that is available is 
rationed on terms other than price considerations. 
It is through these three channels that monetary policy is assumed to 
operate; it will be througji these three channels that the effects of 
discretionary policy on the mortgage credit market for single-family, 
owner-occupied, conventionally financed housing units, hereafter referred 
to as simply the mortgage credit market, are examined. The cost-of-capital 
effect and wealth effect are assumed relevant to the demand for mortgage 
credit, whereas credit rationing and, indirectly, the wealth effect are 
assumed relevant to the supply of mortgage credit. Chapter six will deal 
with the empirical results and conclusions of the complete model. 
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II. REVIEW OF THE IIIERATDRE 
A. Points of View 
Although similarities between this study and past econometric studies 
undoubtedly exist, I believe this paper makes a twofold contribution: the 
theoretical approach taken in developing a model of the mortgage credit 
market ; and the attempt to directly relate discretionary monetary policy 
to this market througji the three channels of monetary policy. A review 
of past studies provides a basis for comparing these contributions to the 
preceding literature. 
The three most recent studies that have been done in the area of 
mortgage markets have been papers by Brady (4), Huang (14), and Jaffee 
(16). Of these three studies, Brady's does not deal directly with the 
mortgage credit market, but is instead primarily concerned with new 
housing starts. In focusing on housing starts, however, Brady has made 
implicit assumptions about their relationship to the mortgage market. 
He also distinguishes between the types of financing involved in housing 
starts, i.e., conventional housing starts, FHA-insured housing starts, or 
VA-guaranteed housing starts. Huang makes the same kind of distinction 
with respect to the type of mortgage credit, whereas Jaffee separates 
the mortgage market into different sectors based on the institutional 
source of the mortgage credit. Some of both features will be used in 
this study, since the primary problem is structural estimation of an 
econometric model of conventional mortgage credit flows from S & L's. 
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B. The Demand Side 
In Brady's a priori functional relationship of the demand for housing 
starts, it is assumed that "net household formation, interregional migra­
tion, housing demolitions and per capita real disposable income should all 
be positively related to the demand for residential housing and that as 
the relative price of housing services declines, the demand for housing 
rises" (4, p. 4), The statistical results of Brady's model led him to 
conclude that the variables on the demand side of the market were not 
significant, and that "the basic demand variables dropped out" (4, p. 17). 
As a result, he concluded that housing starts depend on the supply of 
mortgage credit through the financial variables associated with that 
credit, and did not depend on demand (4), (12). 
Huang does not contradict Brady's conclusion, but since Huang is 
dealing with a particular market in the financial sector, the mortgage 
credit market, he does provide a twist in the method used. His study is 
concerned with the demand for mortgage loan funds by the household sector 
and is postulated as a stock adjustment function. That is, the gross 
demand for mortgage credit is a function of the proportional difference 
between the desired level of mortgage debt, which is treated as a function 
of the desired stock of housing and the interest rate on mortgage borrow­
ing, and the opening stock of mortgage debt. Similar to Brady's demand 
function above, Huang assumes the desired stock of housing to be a function 
of disposable personal incone and the ratio of the rent component of the 
consumer price index and the Boeckh index for the cost of residential 
construction. But unlike Brady, Huang includes in the demand for mortgage 
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credit the credit terms of the loan-to-value ratio, the length of 
amortization period, and the contractual interest rate in the demand for 
mortgage credit function. The contractual interest rate is replaced by 
the market mortgage yield, which Huang considers the relevant cost-of-
borrowing variable. This variable has the expected negative effect when 
the demand function is estimated with two-stage least-squares. In studies 
by Sparks (26) and Silber (23), the yield coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant, while in the studies by Brady (4) and Jaffee (16) 
the sign of the yield variable is difficult to determine. 
Huang combines the two noninterest credit terms into one composite vari­
able called the "percentage of loan to value paid per annum" which is. obtained 
by dividing the loan-to-value ratio by the average length of loan amortiza­
tion (14, p. 15). He gets the expected negative coefficient on this variable. 
Another variable in Huang's demand function is included to take into 
consideration the short-run financial decision of the household sector. 
Because there is some statistical evidence that households accumulate 
liquid assets in anticipation of expected large expenditures (31), and 
the relatively low cost of savings withdrawals for these expenditures, 
the ratio of the increase in savings accounts to net acquisition of 
capital market instruments by households is the variable that Huang 
chooses to measure the adjustment in the portfolios of households. 
Jaffee states that the demand for mortgage credit by the household 
is related to the theory of portfolio choice. "The basic variable in such 
a formulation, at a given point in time, is the household's level of net 
worth" (16, p. 39). The household will distribute its total net worth 
among various financial and real assets in order to maximize seme utility 
7 
function, where the utility function takes into consideration the services 
provided by the real assets, the interest inccane obtained from financial 
assets, and liquidity value of both types of goods. If the possibility of 
borrowing is introduced into the decision process, then the households* 
ability to obtain credit will depend upon some type of collateral require­
ment. Therefore, the demand for mortgage credit by households will depend 
on the stock of houses. A stock adjustment process is introduced to con­
sider the change in the demand for mortgage credit. The speed of adjust­
ment to the desired level of mortgage debt will depend on the relative 
cost of mortgage financing, where the alternative is a weighted average 
of rates on other instruments. 
C, The Supply Side 
Although most past studies have derived the demand functions as a 
result of a priori knowledge of the maximizing conditions of consumer be­
havior or portfolio management, little has been done by way of attempting 
to explain the supply functions on a similar basis. Evidently, most 
studies implicitly assume the supply function to be the result of the 
maximizing behavior of the financial institutions involved in the mort­
gage credit market. 
The supply function for housing starts formulated by Brady in his 
working paper includes many of the financial variables that have appeared 
in the demand functions for mortgage credit of other studies. It seems 
that the a priori formulation of the supply function by Brady follows 
from the Guttentag conclusion that fluctuations in the supply of mortgage 
credit were more important than fluctuations in demand in determining 
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fluctuations in residential construction (12). But while Brady's a priori 
supply function reflects this conclusion, at the same time it includes 
variables that appear to be relevant to the demand for mortgage credit 
such as the interest rate on mortgages, amortization periods, loan-to-
value ratios, and residential construction costs. 
Huang provides a supply function that includes the net savings in­
flow into bank and nonbank financial intermediaries, the yields from non-
mortgage capital market instruments as proxies for the opportunity cost 
of mortgages, the rate of interest on mortgages, and a variable to measure 
the effect on the mortgage market of monetary policy which will be dis­
cussed later. These are basically the same variables that are included 
in Jaffee's supply function, although two distinguishing characteristics 
separate the studies. First, Jaffee's supply function is assumed to be 
the result of the intermediaries* efforts to manage their portfolios with 
respect to the net yields and liquidity value of the assets. Huang makes 
no assumptions about the behavior of the intermediaries but does provide 
explanations for the variables he includes in the supply function. The 
second characteristic is that Jaffee uses a stock adjustment model with 
respect to the mortgages the intermediaries desire to hold plus the net 
inflow of deposits, and mortgage repayments to these intermediaries, as 
variables of mortgage credit supplied. The desired level of mortgages 
that the actual level is adjusted to is a function of the difference 
between the mortgage rate of interest and the interest rate on a single 
capital instrument. Jaffee realizes that mortgages are substitutes for 
many capital instruments but for statistical purposes has eliminated all 
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but one. Huang does use an adjustment model for the demand side of his 
model but makes no attempt to formulate the supply function in a similar 
manner. 
D. Adjustment 
When a study of the mortgage credit market is undertaken, one 
problem that is encountered is measuring the credit rationing effect on 
this particular market. As a result, most recent studies (Huang (14) 
and Jaffee (16)) have included a mortgage interest rate adjustment 
mechanism to take into consideration the lag of adjusting the interest 
rate to the equilibrium rate. Introducing an adjustment mechanism, 
however, causes problems of identification and estimation. These arise 
basically because: "(1) the time-series data on the supply of mortgage 
credit and the demand for mortgage credit are identical and these variables 
are both endogenous in the market context, and (2) the existence of credit 
rationing is rather difficult to capture statistically" (14, p. 17). 
When allowance is made for a disequilibrium mortgage rate, assump-
Lxfjas must be made to alleviate those conditions that cause the estima­
tion problem. Huang assumes that the observed points fall on the demand 
curve rather than the supply curve, so that the difference between the 
first-stage estimate of mortgage credit supplied and the actual observa­
tion gives a measure of the excess supply. He also includes the change 
in the noninterest credit terms variable to consider the credit rationing. 
Jaffee's assumptions are more difficult to follow. His empirical 
results indicate "that the supply of mortgage (credit) is relatively 
unresponsive to the current mortgage rate because of the reliance on 
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advance commitments" (16, p. 42). As a result, in the short-run the 
mortgage rate is assumed to adjust such that it brings the current mortgage 
credit demand into line with the predetermined supply. Because commit­
ments are of primary importance to the supply side, the observed mortgage 
flows were considered the demand variable in the adjustment mechanism. 
Credit rationing is implied to exist in the market by allowing for 
an adjustment of the interest rate to the equilibrium rate. If this rate 
of adjustment is assumed to be less than one, then credit-rationing is 
the alternative, i.e., the use of noninterest credit terms in allocating 
the mortgage credits available to alternative uses. 
E. Monetary Effects 
Most recent econometric models of the mortgage market have incorpor­
ated the effects of monetary policy by the use of an "index of monetary 
policy". The problem is, that the index is, in most cases, applied only 
to the supply side of the market. Also, there has been no attempt to 
separate the effects of monetary policy on the mortgage credit market. 
This is unusual, since fluctuations in this market are so closely associa­
ted with fluctuations in the housing sector where monetary policy is 
assumed to have such an immediate and pronounced effect. Brady includes 
an index of monetary stringency as one of the supply variables of his model 
but, as such, it is difficult to follow its effect on the market. He does, 
however, consider what he calls the "Maisel-Brcwnlee Controversy". 
Brownlee concludes that fluctuations in residential construction activity 
are a result of the high interest elasticity of demand for residential 
housing. Thus during periods of monetary stringency, the high interest 
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rates will cause a decrease in demand for housing. Maisel concludes that 
housing is determined primarily by supply variables, since it is dependent 
on the supply of mortgage funds. Monetary stringency widens the spread 
between capital market rates and the regulated rate paid on deposits of 
financial intermediaries. This causes deposits to fall and thus the 
supply of funds available for mortgages to decrease. Brady's empirical 
work supports the Maisel hypothesis. 
Huang also considers the monetary effects on the mortgage credit 
market by analyzing the time lag between monetary variables, such as the 
monetary base, and mortgage credit flows and yields. Some of the in­
ferences that are made from the results are that (a) the peak effect of 
the monetary base on mortgage credit flows is manifested during the 
current quarter and (b) when the monetary base expands, the mortgage 
yields initially fall, but after six months the yields rise. Therefore, 
along with the credit rationing effect implied by the adjustment mechanism, 
the monetary base is included in the supply function of mortgage credit. 
Similar to Brady, Huang does not consider monetary effects on the demand 
side of the mortgage market. 
In the third study, Jaffee allows for credit rationing by including 
an adjustment mechanism in his model of the mortgage market. Such a 
mechanism makes possible a disequilibrium mortgage rate. However, since 
this model is only a part of a much larger simultaneous model, no other 
channel of monetary policy is explicitly outlined. One set of estimates 
of the model presented by de Leeuw and Gramlich (8), suggested that the 
only channel of monetary policy that was evident in the housing sector 
was that of credit rationing. 
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F, Comparison 
There are four major differences that exist between the econometric 
models that have been reviewed above and the econometric model that is to 
be developed in this study. The first difference is that monetary policy 
is assumed to have three channeled effects on the mortgage credit market. 
They are the cost-of-capital effect, the wealth effect, and the credit 
rationing effect. 
Second, monetary policy affects not only the supply of mortgage credit 
but also the demand. The mortgage credit studies reviewed above have ig­
nored the effects of monetary policy on the entire market. In order to be 
more comprehensive in measuring the effects of monetary policy, this study 
takes into consideration the channeled effects on the demand as well as the 
supply of mortgage credit. 
The third difference is that mathematics is used to assist in the 
theoretical construction of the market equations. The calculus of varia­
tions provides a dynamic approach to the mortgage credit problem. 
The adjustment mechanism incorporates the relationship between the 
nominal rate of interest on mortgage credit and the demand for mortgage 
credit. This is another difference between the other mortgage studies and 
this study of mortgage credit. Also, the adjustment mechanism allows for 
changes in the nominal mortgage rate of interest which may be caused by 
other than a disequilibrium condition in the market. 
There may be additional comparisons that can be made between this and 
past studies, but these four differences are felt to be the major differ­
ences. They are felt to be important enough to warrant the presentation of 
the model, the empirical results, and the conclusions. 
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III. DEMAND FOR MORTGAGE CREDIT 
A. Introduction 
The equilibrium conditions of a household's accumulated wealth rest 
implicitly on maximizing behavior. "It so happens that in a wide number 
of econometric problems it is admis sable and even mandatory to regard our 
equilibrium equations as maximizing (minimizing) behavior" (22, p. 22). 
From these conditions we can derive the desired level of assets that 
should be held by the household in its portfolio. 
Moreover, it is possible to derive operationally meaningful 
restrictive hypotheses on consumers* demand functions from the 
assumption that consumers behave so as to maximize an ordinal 
preference scale of quantities of consumption goods and services 
(of course, this does not imply that they behave rationally in 
any normative sense) (22, p. 21). 
Household behavior, with respect to its non-human wealth, will be deter­
mined by an attempt to maximize the returns it receives from the asset 
portfolio in every time period (maximizing net worth), subject to the 
substitutability of the assets which is taken into consideration by intro­
ducing an objective function of risk and return. It is assumed that the 
assets held are both real and financial (11). The real asset is housing 
and the financial assets are savings, equities, and bonds. Of these 
assets, only the real asset, housing, is a debt-financed asset. That is, 
any long-term debt accumulated during the period by the individual is 
directly proportional to the change in the amount of housing held. It is 
also assumed that these assets are substituted for one another but are less 
than perfect substitutes due to differences in the exchange costs, market­
abilities, reversibilities, and negotiabilities, i.e., differences in 
14 
liquidity. With the purchase of each asset, there is associated with that 
asset some level of risk, and the risk associated with one type of asset 
is never the same as that associated with another type, but all assets of 
the same type have the same risk. Thus, the preference function depends 
upon the return and the risk of the assets included in the portfolio, and 
is treated as the objective function of the maximization problem. This 
"utility function" is assumed to satisfy the necessary conditions for an 
interior solution to exist. 
The household will additionally take into consideration their human 
wealth when attempting to maximize the total wealth accumulated over time. 
The return on human wealth will be expressed by the wages and salaries of 
the household. 
This is not an attempt to revise the theory of consumer behavior, but 
only an attempt to apply the theory to a particular problem. 
There is, moreover, considerable advantage in discussing the 
problem first in its full generality. The high degree of abstract-
ness will be more than compensated for in the ease with which 
numerous applications can be deduced as special cases (22, p. 23). 
Some of the assumptions mentioned above may seem to be over simplifying, 
but to analyze with any precision a ccmplex market such as that of mort­
gage credit, a certain degree of simplification is required. Hopefully, 
the approach taken to analyze the mortgage credit market will provide the 
means to obtain meaningful restrictive hypotheses. 
B. Maximizing the Household's Wealth 
The motives for holding wealth are outlined by Milton Friedman to 
include (1) the need for the household to maintain some even flow of 
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expenditures even though their receipts vary widely from time period to 
time period, (2) their desire to earn interest on loans when the interest 
rate is positive, and (3) the household will attempt to hedge against un­
certainty by maintaining a reserve for emergencies (11). As a result, the 
household will attempt to maximize their wealth, given the constraints 
that are relevant to its optimizing decisions. 
There are a number of different forms that wealth can take; the major 
general distinction is between human and nonhuman wealth (11). Human 
wealth is the element that provides the salary that the individual can 
command in the market. This implies that the marginal physical produc­
tivity of labor services from an educated and/or experienced worker is 
higher than that of an uneducated and/or experienced unit of labor. There­
fore, as more time and money is invested into the labor unit, the greater 
the productivity and, as a result, the higher the salary (higjher wage rate 
at same number of hours worked) he can demand in the labor market. The 
return on human capital is the salary (W(t)) of the household. 
The other form of wealth is nonhuman wealth. All forms of nonhuman 
wealth are not equally satisfactory in the portfolio. Another major 
distinction that can be made is between real and financial assets of the 
nonhuman component of wealth. 
The household attempts to hold in its portfolio the optimal levels of 
nonhuman assets, i.e., bonds, time deposits, housing, and equities, in 
such a way as to maximize the net receipts of the portfolio discounted 
over time. With the aid of the assumptions given at the beginning of this 
chapter, the function that represents the net receipts can be expressed as: 
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R(t) = r^(t)B(t) + rj^(t)H(t) + r^(t)E(t) + rg(t)S(t) - c^(t)D(t) 
where R(t) is the net receipts; r^(t) is the yield rate on bonds; B(t) is 
the dollar value of bonds held in the portfolio; r^(t) is the yield rate 
on housing; H(t) is the dollar value of housing held in the portfolio; 
r^Ct) is the yield rate on time deposits; S(t) is the dollar value of time 
deposits held in the portfolio; r^(t) is the yield rate on equities; E(t) 
is the dollar value of equities held in the portfolio; c^^t) is the cost-
of-credit in the present period (t); D(t) is the amount of debt accumulated 
during the present period; and R^(t) is the dollar value of amortized pay­
ments from debt accumulated in past periods. 
The reason D(t) is used is because it takes into consideration the 
change in the stock of debt (L(t)) and the portion of past debt repaid 
during the present period (@L(s)). The usual expression for net invest­
ment is gross investment minus replacement. If that principle is applied 
to the accumulation of debt by the household, the debt accumulated is 
equal to gross debt minus debt repaid. The expression would be: 
L(t) = D(t) - eL(s), 
which, when solved for D(t), becomes: 
D(t) = L(t) + 0L(s). 
Because of the heterogeneity in the cost-of-credit over time, the present 
cost-of-credit should apply not only to the change in the stock of debt, 
but to any debt accumulated during period t. As a result, included in the 
glossary of terms is provided at the end of this study. 
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expression above is the portion of past debt repaid, which, if relevant 
to the amount of debt accumulated during the present time period, is 
financed at the new cost-of-credit. 
It should also be noted that repayments include both interest pay­
ments and repayment of the debt. This means that the repayments are 
equal to the following: 
R (t) = c (s)L(s) + 0L(s), 
e u 
where c^(s) is the old cost-of-credit, L(s) is the amount of debt out­
standing at the beginning of the period, and 0 is the portion of that debt 
to be repaid. If repayments are canceled out by new accumulations of debt, 
that new debt will be financed at the new cost-of-credit, i.e., the 
present interest rate on mortgage credit. Therefore, the repayments must 
be included for a second time because they represent a liability. 
Ccanbining the two components, salary and net receipts, provides the 
income flow that the household will receive during a particular time 
period. Therefore, the objective function that is to be maximized is the 
income flow: 
F(t) = W(t) + R(t). 
Because of the uncertainty with respect to future flows, the elasticity 
of expectations with respect to the income flow is assumed equal to one, 
i.e., any percentage change in current income is assumed to cause an equal 
percentage change in expected income. Therefore, the wealth of the house­
hold is the discounted present value of the future expected income flow 
over a finite time period. 
In addition to the present discounted value of the flow of funds that 
will result from the wealth of the household, some consideration must be 
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given to the increased risk that the household assumes when its port­
folio consists primarily of only one asset. The preference for a parti­
cular asset is a function of both the return on that asset and the level 
of risk associated with holding more of that asset in the portfolio. 
Therefore, the risk element should be included in the objective function. 
This is accomplished by including in the expression an implicit cost 
function for the household that measures the additional risk that results 
from shifting between assets. The cost-risk function will be represented 
by the general form: 
= F(B/K, H/K, E/K, S/K), 
where is the implicit cost associated with the risk of the portfolio, 
K is the total dollar value of the assets, and B, H, E, S are the dollar 
values of bonds, housing, equities, and savings, respectively. This 
particular function is assumed strictly convex, which will guarantee the 
concavity of the objective function—a necessary condition for an interior 
solution to the maximization problem. By specifying the cost-risk function 
in this manner, an additional assumption is implied about the household's 
behavior, i.e., it is a risk averter. 
The constraints on the wealth function (F(t)) are that any debt 
accumulated in the period is used to finance housing and that the down 
payment for housing must come from wages, realized return on the portfolio 
of nonhuman wealth, and/or changes in the stock of other assets. The first 
constraint is that the amount of aebt accumulated during the period is 
proportional to the change in the stock of housing. Other than 
housing, no other asset in the portfolio is financed with debt. As a 
result, the constraint will be represented by: 
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D = aH, 
where rv is the loan-to-value ratio and H is the change in the stock of 
housing in period t. It was stated earlier that D = L + 0L(s) and if this 
expression is substituted into the one above, the result will be: 
L + 0L(s) = q-H. 
The above expression states that if there is a change in the stock of 
housing held by the individual, it is proportional (a) to the gross of 
mortgaged debt accumulated during the period. 
The second constraint is that the portion of the change in the housing 
stock held by the household not covered by the mortgage credit it receives 
must be financed by transferring the equity it has in other assets accumu­
lated as part of its portfolio (primarily the savings account), the return 
on the portfolio that it may wish to use for the down payment, and that 
part of wages of the current period that is not used for consumption pur­
poses. This constraint can be expressed as: 
(1 - = R- E- S - B+ W- C - , 
where R is the net receipts from the portfolio held; E, S, and B are the 
changes in equities, savings, and bonds, respectively; W is the salary of 
the household; C is the level of consumption expenditures; and R^ is the 
amortized payment of past debt. 
Combining the objective function of wealth (F(t)) and the constraints 
relevant to the portfolio decisions of the household, the result is the 
following Lagrangian expression: 
CD 
J = r •fe"^^[W + r, B + r, H + r E + r S - c ,D - R 
J L  b h e  s  d e  
0 
- F(B/K, H/K, E/K, S/K)] + \j^ (t)[D - Q-H] + Xg(%)[(! - e)H - R - W 
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+ C+ R +Ê + S+ B]l-dt. [3.1] 
To simplify the notation, let everything within the braces be represented 
by f(t). The first-order conditions are as follows: 
ÈiM = 
âR 
afCt) _ d 
âB dt 
e"^ ' + X^ (t) = 0. 
ôfM 
ô5 





-!fXSl . 1 
:4H dt ââ 
-rt ÔF -rt d r . . 
- EË ^  
+ (1 - oOXgCt)] = 0" 









1^^) = (1 - a)H + iÊ+S+B - (R+W-C-R^)=0. [3.9] 
The Legendre conditions of maximization are assumed to hold. 
It can be shown from above that XgCt) equal to e and that 
Xj^(t) is equal to c^e . The first tics derivatives of these variables 
are dX2(c)/dt = -re and dXj^(t)/dt = rc^e + e ^ ^c^. Substituting 





ÔH I ^h® 
•rt âZ -rt 
" ÔH ® 
p -rt -rt* m 
a[rc^e - e c^] 
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+ (1 - a)re = 0. 
af(t) d 
ÔB " dt 
5f(t) d 
ÔE " dt 
S£(t) _ d 
as dt 
° - H ®"" + = "• 
rX" - If e-" + r«-rt = 0. 
e Of# 





The partial derivatives 3F/ÔB, ÔF/ôE, 9f/9h, and 9F/ôS are equivalent to 
the marginal risk of bonds, equities, housing and savings, respectively. 
Therefore, the rate of substitution (RS) between housing and any other 
asset held in the portfolio, e.g., bonds, is equal to the ratio of the 
implicit rates of return: 
[3.14] 
where r^* = (r^ + r)e and r^* = [r^ - ^ rc^ + QfC^ + (1 - a)r]e 
Because of the debt financing involved, the implicit rate of return on 
housing (r^*) is not simply the yield rate plus the rate of discount like 
on the other assets included in our model, but involve a number of credit-
related variables. That is, the implicit rate of return on home ownership 
depends not only upon the yield rate on housing (r^) and cost-of-credit 
(c^), but also on the change in the cost-of-credit (c^), the rate of dis­
count (r), and the loan-to-value ratio (cy). This implicit rate on housing 
is: 
r^* = \ - a(r)(Cj) + cfCCj) + (1 - a)T, [3.15] 
which is obtained from the first-order maximizing condition of the port­
folio with respect to housing. 
If we examine the expression [3.15] above, we see that a change in 
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the cost-of-credit, c^, will have a positive effect on the implicit rate 
of return on housing, but that the level of the cost-of-credit will have 
a negative effect. 
From the Euler equations, it is evident that a change in the housing 
stock (H) will depend upon the implicit rate of return on housing (r^*). 
Also, from the second constraint in the Lagrangian expression, the amount 
of debt accumulated (D) is some proportion (a) of the change in housing. 
Therefore, the amount of debt accumulated during period t will be a 
function of the change in the cost-of-credit (c^). 
The ratio of the implicit rates of return on the assets: 
Rates of substitution (RS) = (SF/9H)/OF/ôj) = 
where j = b, e, and s, 
the constraints: 
•  . . .  
D = ®H, and (1 - q^ ) H  =  R +  W -  C -  E -  S -  B -  R ^  
and the conditions that: 
r, * = r, - riyc, +a(c,) + (1 - a)r and r.* = r. + r, where j = b, 
n  n  a  •  a  J . J  
e, and s, provide a model of household portfolio behavior. 
C. Demand for Mortgage Credit 
By solving the first-order conditions of maximization for the amount 
of debt, D(t), accumulated by the household in any period, we can obtain 
the demand for mortgage credit as a function of the implicit rates of 
return on housing, bonds, savings, and equities, and the component of 
wages and salaries not used for consumption expenditures plus the return 
on the portfolio held. 
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n(t ) - r ,(r*, r*, r *, r * , W - C  +  R -  R ) + u  
1 li e s b e [3.16] 
If the second constraint, equation 3.9 above, is rearranged and 
solved for W - C + R - R^, then the results are: 
This expression says that any change in the stock of assets less liabili­
ties is due to the flow of funds that is available for saving purposes, 
i.e., the return on the portfolio plus the wages and salaries not used 
for consumption purposes munus the amortized payment of past debts. There­
fore, a change in the value of the assets can be represented by the change 
in net worth. That is, the value of the assets minus the value of the lia­
bilities is equal to net worth. Since the above expression is presented 
in terms of first differences with respect to time, the variables 
(1 - Qf)H, Ê, S, and B, can be replaced by the change in net worth, NW. 
The net receipts of the portfolio, R, include both realized and unrealized 
gains in the assets held by the household. Thus, net receipts will be 
caused not only by the acquisition of additional assets but also changes 
in the value of assets presently held. 
The demand for mortgage credit depends heavily upon the change in the 
Implicit rates of return that are obtained from the assets held in the 
portfolio. But the change in the implicit rate of return on housing 
depends upon the terms of mortgage credit, since housing is the only asset 
included in the model that may be purchased with the use of debt financing. 
Therefore, a household's demand for conventional mortgage credit will be: 
W - C + R - R ^ = ( l -  a ) H  +  B  +  Ê  +  S  
W - C + R - R  = N W  
e 
D = fgCr^, c^. Of, r^*, Ntf) + u. D.17] 
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IV. SUPPLY OF NŒŒGàGE CREDIT 
A. Introduction 
The supply of mortgage credit from S & L's depends primarily upon 
their willingness to purchase conventional mortgages for the financing 
of single-family, owner-occupied homes. This statement does not imply 
that the ability of S & L's to lend is solely determined by their own 
objective functions and the legalities and regulations that constrain 
those functions. What this suggests is that the mortgage credit supplied 
by S & L's is also constrained by the amount of funds at its disposal to 
purchase mortgages, i.e., savings deposits, FHLB advances, etc. Because 
S & L's are primarily mortgage lending institutions, "their investments 
are limited by law, regulation and custom mainly to loans secured by 
residential real estate, and particularly by the single-family, owner-
occupied hcsne" (29, p. 76). In 1970, mortgage loans secured by single-
family homes made up 75.8 percent of the dollar volume of loans issued by 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) insured S & L's. 
Mortgage loans held by S & L's totaled $150.6 billion or 98.8 percent of 
2 
the total loan portfolio. As a result, it is evident that the decision 
by the S & L's to purchase additional mortgages is constrained by variables 
over which they have little or no control, 
S & L's deal primarily in mortgages, which makes for a simple balance 
sheet (Table 1). But this does not mean that mortgages are the only asset 
in their portfolios. Some of the other assets that appear in S & L balance 
2 
The data presented throughout this section was obtained from the 
Savings and Loan Fact Book. 1971 (29). 
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TABLE 1 
CCHTOENSED STATEMENT OF CONDITION OF ALL SAVINGS AND LQ&N 







Mortgage Loans Outstanding: 
Insured by the Federal Housing 
Adminis trat i on 
Guaranteed by the Veterans 
Adminis tration 
Conventional Loans 
Passbook, Home Improvement and Other 
Nonmortgage Loans 
Federal Home Loan Bank Stock 
Cash on Hand and in Banks 
Regulatory Liquid investments 
Other Legal Investments 
Building and Equipment 
All (Dther Assets 
Total Assets 
LIABILITIES AND RESERVES : 
Savings Deposits: 
Earning Regular Rate or Below 
Earning in Excess of Regular Rate 
Federal Home Loan Bank Advances 
Other Borrowed Money 
Loans in Process 
All Other Liabilities 
General and Unallocated Reserves 


























6 . 8  












^Percentages may not add to totals due to rounding. 
^Preliminary. 
^Sources: Federal Home Loan Bank Board; United States Savings and 
Loan League. 
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sheets are (1) government securities and investment and (2) cash. These 
two assets are held because of liquidity requirements that are placed on 
S & L's to insure against any unusual change in the flow of deposits out 
of S & L's. 
Three assets, mortgage loans outstanding, regulatory liquid invest­
ments, and cash on hand and in banks, made up 94.1 percent of the total 
assets held by S & L's at year-end 1970. If only conventional mortgages 
are considered rather than all mortgage loans, the three assets still 
accounted for 83.5 percent of the assets held. It is evident that S & L's 
are very active in a specific component of the mortgage credit market. 
That component is conventional loans secured by single-family, owner-
occupied homes. 
The liabilities and reserves side of the balance sheet for S & L's 
year-end 1970 consists primarily of three items, savings deposits and 
Federal Home Loan Bank advances in the liability section, and general 
unallocated reserves in the reserves section. Similar to any firm or 
financial institution, the claims against S & L's is the savings deposits. 
At year-end 1970, these deposits accounted for 89.2 percent of the total 
liabilities. As a result, the savings deposits are the primary source of 
funds for extending mortgage credit. Any control that S & L's may have 
over the fluctuations in these deposits will provide additional security 
with respect to the liquidity obligations that must be met during the time 
period. The rate of interest paid on savings deposits is the most signi­
ficant form of control over these deposits that the S & L's have, even 
though regulations have limited the rates that S & L's can pay. 
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The flow of funds in and out of S & L*s is still susceptible to eco­
nomic conditions, in spite of the FHLBB attempts to stabilize this flow, 
or at least to dampen the effect that a sudden change in the S & L's 
liabilities (decrease) will have on the asset side of the portfolio. The 
FHLB system performs this function by making loanable funds available to 
S & L's in the form of advances. When interest rates are high relative to 
the rate paid on deposits, savings move out of S & L's into investment 
alternatives. Because the S & L's portfolio consists primarily of mort­
gages, which are long-term contracts, whereas savings deposits at S & L's 
can be very short-term in nature, an unexpected flow of deposits from the 
S & L's could cause a liquidity problem. The dilemma of the S & L indus­
try is the imbalance between the time elements of assets and liabilities. 
Since most of the funds used by S & L's to purchase mortgages come frcsa 
the deposits placed in these associations, the quantity and stability of 
deposits are important considerations. 
Advances from the Federal Home Loan Bank System is another liability 
listed in the balance sheet of S & L's. It accounted for 6.4 percent of 
the total liabilities of S & L's at year-end 1970, making it the second 
largest liability of S & L's. Advances are loans which are subject to 
a wide range of terms and conditions that are made to member associations 
by the FHLBB. They may be for a short or a long term, secured or un­
secured, and amortized or single-payment. At year-end 1970, 71 percent 
of the advances to members were short-term and 98.2 percent were secured. 
The primary sources of funds for S & L's to extend credit are the 
savings deposits and the FHLBB advances. Together, these liabilities 
accounted for 89 percent of the assets held at year-end 1970. 
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The general and unallocated reserves of the S & L's are set aside to 
protect depositors against any loss that may be incurred on the asset side 
of the balance sheet. The unallocated portion of reserves (surplus) may 
be used to pay interest on savings accounts in the event that current 
income is not sufficient to meet this expense (10). 
B. Maximizing the S & L's Portfolio 
S & L*s can be federally chartered or state chartered. The federally 
chartered associations are mutually owned. The state chartered associa­
tions can be mutually owned or have some form of permanent stock owner­
ship. At the end of 1970, 87.6 percent of the associations were mutual 
institutions and these associations held 79.3 percent of the aggregate 
assets of the savings and loan industry. The mutual associations out-
distant the permanent stock associations in terms of numbers and assets 
held, 9 to 1 and 4 to 1, respectively. Therefore, in accordance with the 
mutual association's attempt to maintain high dividends to its owners 
(shareholders), who in this case are the depositors, and to provide the 
maximum security for the association, profits will be defined as the 
dividend paid on capital, general reserves, and surplus. The dividend 
paid to the shareholders are fixed by the advertised interest rate on 
savings deposits, which has an upper limit placed upon it by the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board. General reserves are usually held in accordance 
with the regulations of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. 
Therefore, to obtain a maximization of profits by S & L's, the only 
variable that can be maximized is the unallocated portion of reserves 
or surplus (R^). Since this is the variable that is maximized by the 
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permanent stock association, we have thus an objective function that is 
relevant for either type of S & L organization, stock or mutual. 
Since savings deposits and FHLB advances are the primary liabilities 
of S & L's, we will assume that these are the only sources of funds avail­
able to the S & L's when they attempt to maximize their profits. Because 
of the regulations that surround the S & L's portfolio composition, the 
only assets assumed to exist in our model will be conventional mortgages, 
cash and government securities. The function that will be maximized by 
the association will then be: 
R = i (t)N(t) + i (s)M(t) + i^(t)G(t) - i.(t)A(t) - i (t)S_(t) - F,^ 
u m m g r s L 
where is the uudisLributed reserves; i^(t) is the interest rate charged 
on mortgages in period t; N(t) is the dollar value of mortgages accumu­
lated by the S & L during the period t; i^(s) is the average interest rate 
charged on past mortgages; M(t) is the amount of past mortgages outstand­
ing in period t; M(t) = M(s) - R^, where R^ is outstanding mortgage credit 
repaid in period t; i^Ct) is the average interest rate on government 
securities; G(t) is the dollar value of government securities held by the 
S & L; i^(t) is the average interest rate of FHLB advances; A(t) is the 
dollar value of advances; i^Ct) is the rate of interest paid on ordinary 
passbook savings deposits; S^^t) is the dollar value of savings deposited 
at the S & L; and F is the fixed cost associated with S & L operations 
during the period. 
The constraints of this function are the liquidity requirement, the 
funds available for mortgage purchases by the S & L, and the limit on 
advances frm the FHLB. 
3 
A glossary of terms is provided at the end of this study. 
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The first constraint, the liquidity requirement, states that the 
amount of cash on hand (C) and government securities (G) held by the S & L 
for liquidity purposes is some percentage (6) of the total savings accounts 
held by the savings and loan. The constraint will be: 
C + G = ÔSj^. 
If the liquidity needs of the S & L increase during a period of 
higher interest rates, the liquidation of government securities could 
result in capital losses. Therefore, to insure against the possibility 
of such losses, a certain portion of the liquidity reserves are held in 
the form of cash (20). The second constraint is: 
C/(C + G) = which can be reduced to, 
C = (0/(1 - 3^))G. 
If we substitute the above expression, the result is: 
(1/(1 - B^))G = 6S^. 
Because of the legal restrictions on substitution among assets, loans 
secured by real estate is the S & L's primary asset; the S & L is con­
strained by the funds it has available for investment into that asset. 
The third constraint can be expressed as : 
N = (1 - 6)S^ + Â + R^, 
where (1-6) is the portion of savings available for mortgage investment 
after liquidity requirements are met; S is the net change in the level of 
savings at the S & L; A is the net change in FHLB advances; and is the 
amortized repayments from past mortgage loans. 
The last constraint is the policy condition placed on the S & L by 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board with respect to advances. The amount of 
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advances that the S & L can receive from the FHLB has an upper limit 
established as a percent of the claims against the association. Since the 
only claims considered in this model that would qualify is the savings 
accounts, the constraint is: 
A ^  -ys^. 
To maximize the discounted flow of net receipts frcsn the portfolio 
subject to the constraints presented above, consider the Lagrangian 
expressicm: 
J  =  J {e"'''[i^(t)N(t) + i^(s)M(t) + igG + i^A - i^S^ - F] 
o 
+ Xo(t)C(l/(l - 3^)G - +X]^(t)[N - (1 - 6)8^ - Â - R^] 
+ X2(t)CA - rSj^] Idt. [4.1] 
Let everything within the braces be represented by f(t), thus simplifying 
the expression above to: 
J = 1 f(t)dt. 
o 
The first-order conditions necessary for a maximum of portfolio net return 
are: 
[4.2] 
+ (1/(1 - 0^))x^(t) = 0. [4.3] 
Miti . d 
dA dt 
5f(t) 
3A = "dt = 0. [4.4] 
[-(1 - 6)x^] =0. [4.5] 
^)=Cl/a-S„)]G-5Sj^ = 0. [4.6] 
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= N - (1 - 6)Si, - À - = 0. [4.7] 
1^ , = rS^  - A ^  0. [4.8] 
From the first-order conditions, the Lagrangian multipliers are, X q(^) ~ 
-(1 - Bg^ige and Xj^(t) = -i^e The time derivative of the second 
multiplier is d/dt(X,) = ri e - e ^^i . As a result, if the strict 
1 m m 
equality holds in the constraint on advances, then the multiplier, XgCt), 
•irt ~xt 
will be equal to ri e - e i - i_e . On the other hand, the other 
^ m m r 
economically feasible solution would be when the strict inequality holds. 
In that case, from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the multiplier is equal to 
zero (X2(t) = 0). This implies that when the S & L's are borrowing from 
the FHLB at a level less than the maximum allowed by FHLB Board policy, 
then the shadow cost of these loans (X2) is not relevant to the decision 
process. It is only when the constraint is satisfied that the multiplier 
is relevant to the first order conditions with respect to savings and 
advances. 
After making the proper substitutions into the first-order condition 
with respect to savings deposits (S^^, the results are: 
af(t) _ d 
dt Hf^r [-is + - y] = "• 
L i 
assuming that the constraint on advances is not satisfied. For the above 
expression to equal zero, the quantity inside the brackets must equal 
zero, which means that: 
- 6(1 - - (1 - 6)(ri^ - i^) = 0, [4.9] 
or the marginal cost of an additional amount of savings flow into the S & L 
must equal its marginal revenue to insure that profits are being maximized. 
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The marginal cost of an additional unit of savings deposited at the 
S&L is i_+(l-ô)i . This expression states that when the S & L increases, 
a m. 
the cost of those additional units of savings will include the interest paid 
to the depositors and the opportunity cost of mortgage yield rate changes. 
The marginal revenue is (1 - Pg^^g ~ consider the 
situation when savings at the S&L increase, the marginal revenue associa­
ted with that increase in savings would be the revenue received from that 
portion of the savings that is used to satisfy the liquidity requirement in 
the form of additional government securities plus the revenue from the 
purchase of additional mortgages at the present mortgage rate. 
The analysis presented of the marginal cost equal to the marginal 
revenue condition of profit maximization on behalf of the S&L, suggests 
the importance of savings deposits to the operation of the financial inter­
mediary. As a result, any policy decisions that are made by federal or 
state agencies that could have a direct or indirect impact upon the level 
of those deposits within the association are subject to analysis by the 
S&L industry. In this section, like the previous section on the demand 
for mortgage credit, we will consider the discretionary policy effects of 
the Federal Reserve System, but an additional policy element will be in­
jected by including the ability of the S & L to manage its liabilities 
through the use of FHL3 advances. 
C. Supply of Mortgage Credit 
The first-order condition of profit maximization with respect to 
savings deposits (S^), that yields the marginal (factor) cost equal 
marginal revenue (product) condition is: 
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is = - 9o)lg + (1 - " 1*)' 
the first-order condition of profit maximization with respect to FHLB 
advances (A), is: 
i_ = ri - i , 
f mm 
and the constraint: 
N = (1 - Ô)S^ + Â + R^, 
represent the conditions of traditional maximizing behavior sufficient to 
derive a supply function for gross flows of mortgage credit. 
If these conditions are solved for the gross mortgage credit supplied 
(N(t)), the following expression results: 
N(t) = k, R^, 1^, ij, 4) [4.10] 
The independent variables of the supply of mortgage credit from a savings 
and loan association are the net flow of savings, the net flow of FHLB 
advances, repayments, the rate of interest on mortgages, the cost of the 
two sources of funds, savings deposits and FHLB advances, and the change 
in the rate on mortgages. Since the profit maximizing conditions of the 
model above require a comparison of the costs of the two sources of funds 
with the mortgage rate, it appears possible to use the difference between 
the weighted average of the costs and the mortgage rate. The weights will 
be determined by the portion of that particular liability used for mortgage 
purchases. The comparison will then be: 
i^ - (agi^ + a^ig) where a^ = A/M and a^ = (1 - 6)S^/M. 
To simplify this comparison even more, i^ will be substituted for a^i^ 
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+ a^ig, thus, the comparison becomes: 
\ ' ^ c* 
The gross supply of mortgage credit, assuming that it can be expressed in 
stochastic form, will be expressed as: 
N = f^(S^, Â, i^ - ig, Rg, i*) + * . [4-11] 
D. Aggregation 
Before proceeding any further in the discussion of the mortgage 
credit market, it is necessary that the model of the demand by a house­
hold and the supply of S & L be transformed to a model of the entire 
market. The model will be expanded to include all households that demand 
credit from S & L's and all S & L's that supply mortgage credit. To per­
form such an aggregation, it is assumed that the households that comprise 
the demand side of the mortgage credit market and the S & L's on the 
supply side of the market are hcmogeneous and consistent with the descrip­
tions and qualifications presented above. This assumption will not alter 
the variables that are included in the supply and demand functions but 
will facilitate the empirical analysis by allowing the use of aggregate 
time-series data. 
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V. THE ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM 
The two sides of the mortgage credit market have been presented. It 
is not necessary to introduce the relationships that are assumed to exist 
between the different elements of the mortgage market. Needless to say, 
not only do recursive relationships exist but also simultaneous relation­
ships that cannot be ignored if a complete analysis of this portion of 
the mortgage market is to be presented. 
In equilibrium the mortgage credit demand will be equal to the credit 
supply. This equilibrium relationship can be used in general to derive 
the equilibrium mortgage rate. However, it is often suggested that such 
an equilibrium condition does not exist in the mortgage credit market but 
that adjustments take place in the market such that the mortgage rate 
moves toward the equilibrium rate of interest. As a result, to analyze the 
disequilibrium situation, an adjustment mechanism must be included in our 
system of equations. 
There are a number of alternative methods that have been presented to 
handle the adjustment problem. (14), (15), (16), all of which have different 
underlying assungtions about the mechanics of the adjustment. There are 
three assumptions necessary to provide an interpretation of the mechanism 
used in this paper. First, excess demand for mortgage credit is the only 
situation that is assumed to exist in the market, i.e., it is impossible 
to have supply greater than demand. Second, an adjustment in the mortgage 
rate of interest is a result of current gross mortgage credit demand moving 
into line with predetermined gross mortgage credit supplied. Third, the 
mortgage credit market is cleared by the end of the quarter, even though 
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credit rationing by the S & L's is assumed to exist. This is due to any-
unexpected changes in the predetermined supply of mortgage credit that will 
occur as a result of unexpected and often uncontrollable changes in the net 
savings flow into the S & L's. The adjustment of the interest rate on 
mortgages will depend upon the change in the stock of mortgage credit. 
That is J the change in mortgage credit outstanding, M(t), is equal to the 
desired level of mortgages held by households, M*, minus the actual level 
of mortgages held at the beginning of the period, The first task 
is to determine the level of mortgages that households desire to hold. 
As stated above, it is the desired stock of mortgages held that is used as 
the basis for deriving the demand-f or-mort gage-credit expression, there 
fore, the desired stock of mortgage credit outstanding is equal to the 
actual level plus gross demand minus repayments (M* = + D(t) - 0L(s)).^ 
The change in the stock of mortgage credit outstanding is: 
M(t) = M* -
but M* = + D(t) - 3L(S), 
therefore, M(t) = + D(t) - 0L(s) -
which can be reduced to, 
M(t) = D(t) - eL(s). [5.1] 
As a result, the adjustment mechanism can be expressed as: 
c^ = i^ = f^(M(t)) + u^. [5.2] 
As noted above, this mechanism applies not only to the change in the 
interest rate on mortgages (i^) in the supply function, but also to the 
change in the cost-of-credit (c^) in the demand equation. This is due to 
4 
A glossary of terms is provided at the end of this study. 
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the fact that the income received by the S & L's from mortgage credit 
extended is eqiial to the cost of that credit to the individuals. There­
fore, the change in the cost-of-credit is equal to the change in the inter­
est rate on mortgages (i^ = c^). 
The adjustment mechanism, as outlined above, does not take into 
consideration the direct effects of monetary policy. This is an important 
point because the change in mortgage credit outstanding may have only a 
minor role in determining the nominal interest rate on mortgages. 
39 
VI. MONETARY EFFECTS 
A. Introduction 
To analyze the effects of monetary policy on the mortgage credit 
market, the cost-of-capital effect, the wealth effect, and credit 
rationing must be introduced into the model. But before the channeled 
effects can be presented, variables must be formulated that can be used 
to reflect changes in discretionary monetary policy. 
The first of the two variables designated to reflect policy changes 
is the change in the commercial banking system's potential to extend 
credit. This particular variable is best illustrated by the change in 
• . 5 
the monetary base, MB, This is done for two reasons: (1) the monetary 
base is considered an important link between Federal Reserve monetary 
actions and their ultimate impact on the economy's performance by a 
significant body of monetary theory, and (2) because Federal Reserve 
Credit, most of which consists of securities held by the Federal Reserve 
(Fed), is the principal source of the monetary base, the monetary authori­
ties have almost complete control over the base (1). Thus, the base re­
flects the monetary authorities' actions better than any other measure 
(Table 2). 
Since securities held by the Fed are so important as a source of the 
monetary base, it will be important in its ability to control the uses of 
the monetary base. It is through open market operations, the buying and 
selling of securities, that the Fed is able to control the source and. 
A glossary of terms is provided at the end of this study. 
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table 2 
CALCUlATIŒï OF THE SOURCE BASE - JUNE 1968 
Monthly Averages of Daily Figures 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Sources of Base 
Federal Reserve Credit: , 
Holdings of Securities +51,396 
Discounts & Advances + 705 
Float + 1,712 
Gold Stock +10,369 
Treasury Currency Outstanding + 6,744 
Treasury Deposits at Federal Reserve - 960 
Treasury Cash Holdings - 973 
Other Deposits and Other 
Federal Reserve Accounts - 177 
Source Base 68,816 
Uses of Base 
Member Bank Deposits 
at Federal Reserve +21,350 
Currency held by Banks + 5,566 
Currency held by the Public +41,900 
Source Base 68,816 
^ï)ata are not adjusted for seasonal variation. 
^Includes acceptances of $90 million not shown separately. 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal 
Reserve Bulletin. The sources and uses of the base are a rearrangement 
of data contained in the first table appearing in the Financial and 
Business Statistics section of the Bulletin -- "Member Bank Reserves, 
Federal Reserve Bank Credit, and Related Items." 
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therefore, has some control over the uses of the base. If the Fed's open 
market policy is to purchase securities, then this enables Federal Reserve 
Credit to increase on the sources side of the base equation, and either 
currency or member bank deposits to increase on the uses side (1). Even 
though the source base makes up the most significant portion of the 
monetary base, it is necessary to provide further adjustments to the source 
base in order to obtain the monetary base desired for analytical use. 
"Because of changes in laws and regulations and in the distribution 
of deposits among banks subject to different regulations, adjustments must 
be made on the source base in order to maintain comparability over time" 
(1, p. 8). These adjustments in the reserve positions of the banking 
system will be applied to the source and expressed in dollar amounts which 
are positive when average reserve requirements fall and negative when they 
rise (1). 
As a result, the monetary base not only takes into consideration open 
market operations through its effect on the source side of the monetary 
base equation but also the changes in the required reserve position of 
commercial banks by including the reserve adjustments. Even after taking 
into consideration the adjustments made in the monetary base to offset the 
short-run fluctuations in the total reserve position of the banking system 
because of changes in items that are not directly controlled such as float 
and currency in circulation, the monetary base still provides a good in­
dicator of monetary policy decisions. 
The second variable is the change in the discount rate, r^, which is 
the third discretionary tool available to the Fed. This variable is used 
as a proxy for the change, or announcing the change, in the cost-of-credit. 
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When the Board of Goveiniors approve a change in the discount rate, it 
changes the cost to member banks of borrowing from Reserve banks, thus 
reflecting possible changes in credit costs (2). 
Host academic economists agree that if the discount rate does have 
any affect on the economy, it is probably the announcement effect. How­
ever, in the 1954 "Report on the Discount Mechanism" (3), it was indi­
cated that periodic revisions in the discount rate must occur to adjust 
the cost of borrowing from the central bank to fall in line with market 
rates. The results of such "technical adjustment" would cause unclear, 
unnecessary and often perverse announcement effects. Because it is 
difficult to separate the announcement effect changes in the discount rate 
frcsn the technical adjustments, it is assumed that any change in the dis­
count rate, r^, is announcing credit policy at the Fed. Also, even 
thougjh discounts and advances are included under Federal Reserve Credit as 
a source of the monetary base, using the change in the discount rate may 
provide some information about the movement of the interest rate on 
mortgages with respect to other interest rates in the econony, i.e., the 
time lag needed in the mortgage credit market to allow the mortgage rate 
to adjust to policy changes reflected in the discount rate. 
B. Monetary Effects on Demand 
When the two variables used to reflect monetary policy, MB and r^, are 
included on the demand side of mortgage credit, all three discretionary 
tools of monetary policy are taken into consideration. It is the channeled 
effects of these two variables that provide the necessary conditions to 
measure the effect of monetary policy on the demand for mortgage credit. 
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Monetary policy is asstaned to operate through two channels on the 
demand side of the market. The first effect is the change in the return, 
on the asset portfolio of the households without altering the composition 
of that portfolio. This is the wealth effect. The wealth effect will be 
expressed by making the change in net worth, NW, which appears in the de­
mand function above, dependent upon wages and salaries, gross flow of 
mortgage credit supplied in the previous period, and the two variables of 
monetary policy—the change in the monetary base and the change in the 
discount rate, MB and r^ respectively. 
m = fg(W, N_1, A, r^) + Ug [6.1] 
The second effect is the cost-of-capital effect. This particular 
effect will fall most significantly upon the cost-of-credit (c^ = i^). 
As a result, the cost-of-capital effect will be included in the adjust­
ment mechanism to express the fact that a change in the interest rate on 
mortgages can be a result of monetary policy changes as well as a result 
of the demand for mortgage credit adjusting to supply, i.e., shifts in 
both the demand and supply functions are as possible as movements along the 
demand curve with respect to the interest rate on mortgages. Expressed in 
functional form, this channeled effect can be represented by: 
c^ = ijjj = fy((N - eL(s)), r^, A) + Uy [6.2] 
C. Monetary Effects on Supply 
Savings and loan associations are faced with a task familiar to 
savings intermediaries, the problem of managing their liabilities. The 
S & L's are basically restricted to the type of assets they may hold and 
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are therefore primarily concerned with the stability and availability 
of their liabilities. This problem can be illustrated by the situation 
where the S & L's experience a net flow of deposits out of their institu­
tions into other savings, consumption, or investment alternatives. 
Because of the long-term nature of the assets they hold, it is difficult 
for the S & L's to adjust their liquidity position without borrowing from 
the FHLB. Advances from the FHLB, however, are limited by the level of 
deposits held by the S & L's as well as the higher cost faced by the FHLB 
to obtain funds to make the advances. This will make it more costly for 
S & L's to obtain advances in order to secure their liquidity position. 
It is this type of situation that causes unusual non-price rationing of 
the funds that S & L's may have available for extending new loans. 
One of the possible causes of a change in the level of deposits at 
S & L's is the effect of a change in monetary policy. The first channel 
through which changes in monetary policy affect the supply side of the 
mortgage credit market is credit rationing. This effect is felt by the 
custcsners of S & L's as a result of the limited availability of funds to 
the S & L due to a decrease in the level of the S & L's deposit liabili­
ties during tight monetary control periods. This can be represented by 
forming an expression where the net flow of deposits into S & L's is a 
function of the two variables of monetary policy. 
= fg(m, r^) + Ug. ' [6.3] 
Also included in the above expression is the change in net worth 
(NW) and the change in net worth of the previous period. By including 
the change in net worth in the net savings flew expression, the wealth 
effect that is felt by those households holding asset portfolios, part or 
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all of which consists of savings deposits at S & L's, is accounted for on 
the supply side of the mortgage credit market by including the effect that 
these changes have on net savings flow. 
Since the change in the cost-of-credit is equal to the change in the 
interest rate on mortgages, the cost-of-capital effect can be included on 
the supply side because i^ is one of the variables that appears on the 
right hand side. This would imply that the cost-of-capital effect would 
also operate on the supply side. 
D, The Complete Model 
All the different parts of the model have been presented above. This 
section of the paper is designed to incorporate the parts into a complete 
model for empirical testing. 
The model will consist of equations 3.17, 4.11, 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3, 
which are a demand equation, a supply equation, an equation for the change 
in net worth, an adjustment mechanism for interest rates, and an equation 
for the net flow of savings deposits with S & L's, respectively. As a 
result, the following flow chart diagram may facilitate the understanding 
of the assumed interdependencies that exist in the model. 
1 Demand for mortgage credit (D)|4- •^Supply of mortgage credit (N)| 
(lagged) 
(lagged) 
Change in net worth (NW) 
Change in the interest ^ 
rate on mortgages (i = c,) 
Change in the savings deposits 
«+• Q X. T »o rc \ 
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VII. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. Introduction 
The statistical techniques that are used to obtain the "best" 
estimates of the coefficients of the variables that appear in the model 
are (1) ordinary least-squares (OLS) to derive first estimates before 
other techniques are used, (2) ordinary least-squares on the transformed 
data to circumvent the problem of autocorrelation (generalized least-
squares, or GLS)j and (3) two-stage least-squares (TSLS) in an attempt 
to account for the simultaneity bias that may be present within the model. 
The primary reason for the use of more than one statistical method in 
obtaining coefficient estimates is to provide a basis for comparison since 
it is very difficult to compare these results with the statistical results 
obtained in other studies of the mortgage credit market. This is due 
primarily to the fact that past mortgage credit models have been designed 
as stock adjustment models. As a result, most of the models have in­
cluded the lagged endogenous variable as one of the predetermined vari­
ables (16), (23), (25). 
The structural equations presented in the previous section are most 
informative about the restrictive hypotheses that the model is designed 
to consider, i.e., the channeled effects of monetary policy. Therefore, 
since the evaluation of the hypotheses depends upon the quality of the 
estimates obtained, a statistical method that will provide efficient, 
consistent, and unbiased estimates is the ideal. Unfortunately, this is 
not always possible to do. As a result, certain tradeoffs have to be 
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made, e.g., the estimates may be consistent and efficient but biased. 
It is the objective of this section to obtain the best estimates of the 
mortgage credit market. 
B. Ordinary Least-Squares (OLS) 
The first technique, ordinary least-squares, is used to derive first 
estimates of the coefficients that appear in the structural equations of 
the model. With the aid of this particular operation, it is possible to 
obtain information about the need for subsequent statistical methods to 
be applied to the model. This technique provides estimates for the param­
eters, "t" statistics to aid in the decision of whether the particular 
independent variables are significant, the corrected squared coefficient 
2 
of multiple correlation (R ) which aids the researcher in determining the 
proportion of explained variance, and the Durbin-Watson statistic which is 
a test of autocorrelation of the residuals. 
OLS is applied to the demand for mortgage credit. The results are: 
D = -55.18 +J8 a + .216 r + 3.87 r* + 12.94 àc + .060 6m,^ [7.1] 
(46.83) (^3) (.106) * (1.49) * (3.61) . (.042) 
2 
^ = «65, 
D-W = 1.23, 
where the numbers in parentheses below the coefficients are their standard 
errors. 
Âlthou^ the **t statistics" for all coefficients except that of 
the loan-to-value ratio are significant,^ concern is caused by the 
2 
low 5 and the low Durbin-Watson statistic that is obtained by the 
g 
A glossary of terms is provided at the end of this study. 
^The significance level throughout this study, is 10 percent. 
48 
_2 
use of ordinary least-squares. The R suggests that only 65 percent of 
the variance can be explained by the variables that appear on the right 
_2 
side of the equation, therefore, a higher R would be desirable. The 
Durbin-Watson (D-W) is 1.23. This value lies in the inconclusive range 
of positive correlation, i.e., the D-W is not lew enough to guarantee 
the presence of positive correlation but it is not high enough to say 
conclusively that it does not exist. Since ordinary least-squares was 
used to derive these results, the D-W statistic is an appropriate test 
for autocorrelation if all the variables on the right side of the equation 
are strictly exogenous (temporarily ignoring the simultaneity of 
the model). 
To correct for possible autocorrelation of the residuals, the data 
is transformed: 
%it* ° \ . hi ' 
and Y* = 7(1 - P^)Yj. 
where are the independent variables at time t, is the dependent 
variable at time t, are the independent variables at time period 0, 
is the dependent variable at time period 0, and p is the autocorre­
lation coefficient of the residuals. This transformed data is used in 
place of the raw data in the ordinary least-squares operation. The 
results are : 
D = -46.64 + .696 cc + .0995 r + 3.59 r* + 11.22 Ac + .061 ANW, [7,2] 
(41.04) (.540) (0.08) " (1.27) (2.98) (.040) 
_2 
R = .71 
D-W = 1.78, p = .5 
After the transformation of the data in an attençt to adjust for 
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possible correlation of residuals, the results suggest a better statistical 
fit, but not considerably better than OLS. Now 71 percent of the variance 
is explained and the D-W statistic exceeds the upper limit (d^ = 1.74) 
which is required for no positive autocorrelation to be present, but the 
coefficient for the yield rate on housing, as well as the coefficient for 
the loan-to-value ratio, is insignificant. 
The theory of demand states that as price decreases, the quantity 
demanded will increase per unit of time. This suggests, at some fixed 
period in time, a negative relationship between price and quantity. 
Since the coefficient for a change in the interest rate on mort­
gages (ACjJ is positive, it may at first glance suggest the wrong sign. 
A portion of the change in the housing stock is financed by the use of 
credit. For this reason, the demand for mortgage credit has included as 
one of its variables the change in the cost-of-credit, c^. The first-
order conditions of the Lagrangian expression provide the solution for 
the implicit rates of return on the assets held in the portfolio. There­
fore, if the implicit rate of return on housing is recalled, r^ - orc^ 
+ ofCj - (1 - a)r , the relationship between the implicit return and a change 
in the interest rate is positive. The coefficient on c^ was expected to 
be positive. This is not the relationship between the stock of mortgage 
credit outstanding and the interest rate on mortgages, but the relation­
ship between the gross flow of mortgages demanded and the change in the 
interest rate. The signs of all the coefficients are the appropriate ones 
to support the hypotheses of implicit rates and portfolio analyses. 
The supply of mortgage credit was also subjected to the ordinary least-
squares method, the results of which are: 
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N = -8.39 + .00032 AS + .00047 6A + 4.089 R + .927 (i - i ) 
(1.71) (.00022) ^ (.00034) (0.527) ® (.366) ° ^ 
+ 1.405 Ai , 
(.927) [7.3] 
2 
R = .95 
D-W = 1.053. 
In. this particular equation, all the coefficients are significant. Also, 
_2 
the R is high but the Durbin-Watson is low. As a result, the same trans­
formation that was used on the demand equation is applied to the variables 
that appear in the supply function. The results are somewhat different. 
N = -9.70 + .00024 AS + .00064 AA + 4.57 R + .793 Ai 
(1.86) (.00016) (.00026 (0.41) ® (.748) ® 
+ .810 (i - i^) 
(.520) ™ [7.4] 
_2 
R = .97 
D-W = 1.62, p = .6 
Not only are the "t statistics" different, making the estimated coefficient 
of Ai insignificant, but the D-W statistic is still within the incon-
in 
elusive range. These results imply that, first, the Ai^ is not one of 
the variables considered in the decision of the S & L to obtain more 
mortgages. This may be due to the fact that the primary income-earning 
asset that S & L's can legally hold is mortgages. Therefore, regardless 
of what the change in the nominal mortgage rate, the S & L's hold mort­
gages. It is possible, however, that when changes occur in the nominal 
rate, the S & L's are capable of managing their liabilities to some 
degree in order to maximize their objective function. Under liability 
management, the insignificance of Ai^ is a contradiction. Second, the 
D-W statistic within the inconclusive range implies that the auto­
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correlation of the residuals, if it does exist, may not necessarily be 
of the first-order type suggested by the transformation that is used on 
the data. 
Ordinary least-squares was also applied to the other equations in the 
model. The first is that of the change in the net worth of the households. 
The results are: 
ANW = -27.49 - 9.243 6r + 10.78 AMB + .0966 W - 1.0288 N 
(10.07) (5.318) (4.33) (.0217) (.5290) [7.5] 
2 
5 = .71 
D-W = 1.68. 
In this particular equation, all the estimated coefficients are signifi-
_2 
cant. The R is acceptable, but the D-W statistic is within the incon­
clusive range. This latter result implies that the null hypothesis of no 
positive autocorrelation of the residuals can not be accepted, but the 
alternative cannot be accepted either. "The test is inconclusive and 
further observations would ideally be required" (17, p. 192). From the 
empirical results on the supply and demand equations, when the D-W was 
in the inconclusive range, the transformed data did not significantly 
improve the statistical results. Therefore, the generalized least-squares 
procedure will not be used on the change in net worth equation, the net 
savings inflow equation, and the adjustment mechanism. 
The change in the stock of savings at S & L's (the net flow of 
savings deposits) is estimated as follows: 
AS = -951.603 - 43.458 ANW + 103.26 ANW + 1780.75 6MB 
(664.205) (28.541) (28.11) (792.32) 
- 2259.73 Ar,, 
(843.12) ^ [7.6] 
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2 
R = .73 
D-W =2.18 
Again, the estimated equation is acceptable with the appropriate signs 
on the variables. However, in this particular equation we have included 
not only the change in net worth but also the lagged change in net worth. 
This implies that the initial effect of a change in net worth on net 
savings at S & L's is negative but after a lag of one period, the effect 
is positive. 
OLS is also applied to the adjustment mechanism of the mortgage credit 
market, the change in the interest rate on mortgages. 
Ac = Ai = .230 + .0398 AM +.426Ar - .2092 AMB, 
™ (.0759) (.0351) (.0847) (.0711) [7.7] 
_2 
R = .65 
D-W = 1.42. 
In this particular equation, all the monetary variables are significant, 
whereas, the change in mortgage credit outstanding is insignificant. 
C. Estimation of the Simultaneous Model 
The statistical methods used above were ordinary least-squares and 
generalized least-squares, but neither of these techniques can take into 
consideration the simultaneous relationships that exist in this market. 
As a result, a third statistical modus operandi, two-stage least-squares 
(TSLS) is used. There are alternative methods available to handle the 
simultaneous problem, such as indirect least-squares, but since the system 
of equations is overidentified, an appropriate method to use.is two-stage 
least-squares. 
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The structural equations are the most informative about the 
hypotheses for which the model is developed, but economists sometimes 
ignore the fact that the conditional equations of the reduced form 
provide the stepping stone of estimating the parameters of the structural 
equations. Therefore, because of the important role played in the 
simultaneous equation process by the coefficients of the reduced equations, 
I thought it worth the effort to include the reduced form equations in this 
section of the paper. 
TSLS is a single-equation method. The reduced equations for the 
endogenous variables are: 
N = njo + "11 ^  + "12 ^ e "13 ^ ""d ^14 + "l5 * + "l6 ^ -1 
+ Û? + 7TI8 \ + TT^9 r* + ANW_^ + u^, [7.8] 
D = TT20 + TT21 or + TTgg r* + + "25 6*» + 
+ 1727 * + T^g + Rg + AA. + + U2, [7.9] 
= TT30 + t t 3^ Ar^ + AMB + 7X33 + 7X3^ r* + 7X33 
+ 773g ÛA + 7737 + 773g + U3, [7.10] 
ANW = T7^O "41 ^ ^d "42 +"43 W + "44 + U4, [7.11] 
= "50 + "51 ^ ""d + "52 + "53 ^ ^-1 + "54 * + ^ 55 ^ -1 
+ Ug. [7.12] 
The reduced equation for the change in net worth, equation [7.11], 
is the same as the ordinary least-squares equation because there exist no 
endogenous variables on the right hand side of the equation. This equa­
tion is therefore a recursive equation and does not require the more 
sophisticated estimation technique of TSLS. The advantage of including 
a recursive equation within the system is that it provides more exogenous 
variables for identification purposes. 
In the remainder of the equations, [7.8], [7.9], [7.10], and [7.12], 
the simultaneous equation technique of TSLS is required. When the 
ordinary least-squares method is applied to a simultaneous-equation 
system, the estimators are biased and inconsistent. The TSLS method does 
not necessarily eliminate the bias but the estimators obtained with this 
method "have the desirable large-sample property of consistency" (17, 
p. 275). 
The two-stage least-squares technique when applied to the model pro­
vides the following estimates of the structural equation: 
N=-07.98 + 4.328 Ai + 0.000546 IS + 0.563 (i - i ) 
(01.84) (2.278) ™ (0.000318) ^ (0.454) ™ ® 
+ 0.000497 M + 03.97 R 
(0.000355) (00.538)® [7.13] 
2 
K = .93 
D-W = 1.85, 
D= -64.6 + 0.089 flW + 14.45 + 3.84 r* + 0.192 r 
(55.5) (0.056) (5.29) " (1.98) (0.111) ^  [7.14] 
+ 9.092 a 
(0.749) 
2 
R = .63 
D-W = 1.28, 
AL = ^, = 0.159 + 0.1006 AM + .4203 Ar - .209 AMB 
° (.0735) (.0720) ^ (.0815) ° (.065) [7.15] 
_2 
R = .68 
D-W = 1.43, 
ANW= -27.49 - 9.24 Ar, + 10.78 Affi + .0967 W - 1.0289 N , 
(10.07) (5.32) ^ (4.33) (.0217) (.5290) [7.16] 
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2 
ïï = .71 
D-W = 1.68 
AS = -717.2 - 2607.11 Ar + 1985.45 AMB - 76.67 ANW 
^ (750.9) (982.5) ® (838.56) (52.98) 
+ 123.05 AM , 
(39.08) [7.17] 
2 
R = .71 
D-W = 2.55. 
If each equation is considered separately, it is evident from the 
above that in most cases the simultaneous technique provides acceptable 
results. However, a caution to accepting the results is necessary. There 
are problems that can be overcane by the use of the TSIS technique but 
other problems still remain. In particular, three statistical problems 
remain, (I) autocorrelation of the residuals, (2) inadequate data, and 
(3) misspecification of the model. 
The problem of autocorrelation of the residuals was considered above 
by the use of OIS on the transformed data. In this particular case, to 
consider the correlation problem, a trade-off must be made with simul­
taneity bias. A choice has to be made as to which one provides the "best" 
estimates for this model. This choice will depend upon the weight given 
to the respective statistical problems, i.e., autocorrelation of the 
residuals on one hand and simultaneity bias on the other. 
The second problem, that of inadequate data, is most certainly 
present. However, this is not unfamiliar to studies of the mortgage and/or 
housing markets. As a result, errors in econonic variables can also be a 
problem. "Such errors may arise because of errors of measurement, or 
because the measurable quantities are not quite the same conceptually as 
56 
the relevant theoretical quantities" (5, p. 251). The demand function 
includes three data series that are of questionable quality. They are the 
rate of return on housing (r^), the change in net worth (ANW), and the 
g 
gross flew of conventional mortgage credit from S & L's (D=^). 
The glossary of terms includes a short explanation of what is used 
as a proxy for these variables. 
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VIII. CffllCLDSIONS 
Credit rationing is assumed to operate primarily througih the change 
in net savings inflow of the savings and loan industry. Because of the 
difficulty of measuring this particular effect, the change in net savings 
inflow is used as a proxy. If rationing does occur, it will be the re­
sult of a change in the liabilities of S & L's, specifically a decrease 
in savings flowing into intermediaries, along with the inability of the 
rate of interest on mortgage credit to be adjusted immediately to elimi­
nate the credit market's excess demand. The policy variables, monetary 
base and discount rate, are found to be significant in the S & L's net 
savings function and the current S & L's net savings inflow is significant 
to the gross flow of mortgage credit from S & L's. 
The wealth effect is assumed to operate on the household sector. 
This effect is the link between monetary policy on the one hand, and the 
level of consumption and savings, on the other. This channel of monetary 
policy is assumed to operate through the changes in the net worth of 
households. The monetary variables, AMB and Ar^, are significant variables 
in the net worth function. Likewise, the change in net worth is signifi­
cant to the gross flow of mortgage credit demanded. 
Monetary forces have not always been found to have such an important 
iz^act on the econony. In fact, several of the large econometric models 
suggest that monetary forces are uninqiortant, e.g., Wharton School model, 
the Conmerce Department model, the Michigan model, and to a lesser extent 
the Brookings model (8). The Federal Reserve-MIT econometric model pro­
vided by the other models listed but found the monetary effects to be slow. 
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Differences in the importance of monetary forces can be attributed to 
the additional channels of policy that are included in the Federal Reserve-
MIT model. The conclusion of the Fed model is that monetary policy works 
more slowly than fiscal policy. If the "quick-acting credit rationing 
and wealth effects of monetary policy" were found to be important during 
the first year, a more rapid operation of monetary policy would have been 
implied (8). 
The econometric model of the mortgage credit market presented here 
implies that monetary policy operates in this particular market much more 
quickly than is implied by several other models because the credit ration­
ing and wealth effects of monetary policy are implied to be important. 
From the empirical results, it is evident that the change in the monetary 
base and the change in the discount rate, in all equations where they 
appear, are not lagged but are changes in the current period. 
The third channel of monetary policy is the cost of capital effect. 
Included in the adjustment mechanism are the two monetary variables, 6MB 
and Ar^. As shown above, both of these variables are significant and have 
the appropriate signs. However, the change in the cost-of-credit variable 
that is included in the demand function has a positive sign and is highly 
significant. This implies that when the mortgage rate increases the demand 
for mortgage credit increases and when the rate declines the demand for 
mortgage credit falls. One explanation of the positive sign on this 
coefficient is that a change in the conventional mortgage rate has a 
positive effect on the implicit rate of return on housing. An alternative 
explanation is to consider the effect of inflation on this sector. Prices 
have not been explicitly considered in the model, but can be implied to 
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exist as part of the interest rate adjustment (21). The data used in the 
model is from the first quarter of 1965 to fourth quarter 1971. During 
this period, the general price level persistently increased, such that 
the nominal rate of interest reflected the expectations of future infla­
tion (21), As a result, even though the nominal interest rate on mort­
gages increased, the real rate may have decreased or at least increased 
by less than the ncminal rate. 
Consequently, during periods of inflation, the nominal rate of inter­
est may include expected changes in the price level and that it is the 
real rate that is relevant to the demand of mortgage credit, i.e., assuming 
a high elasticity of housing demand with respect to the real interest rate. 
If inflation is expected to continue and the change in the nominal rate of 
interest reflects those expectations, then the prices of real assets will 
also be expected to increase, thus making the fixed dollar assets less 
attractive and the marketable real assets (e.g., housing) more attractive. 
As a result, the cost-of-capital effect may be slow in its effect and mis­
leading as an indicator of monetary policy's impact on the conventional 
mortgage credit market during periods of inflation. 
The empirical results support the hypothesis that monetary policy has 
a multi-channeled effect on the mortgage-credit market. It also supports 
the hypothesis that monetary policy has an impact on both the supply of 
and demand for mortgage credit. However, for short-run fluctuations in 
mortgage credit flows, it is concluded that only two of the three channels 
of monetary policy are relevant. These two channels are the credit ration­
ing effect on the supply side and the wealth effect on the demand side. 
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IX. GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Because of the number of terms and my reluctance at times to 
immediately define a term when it is presented, I include a list of these 
terms along with the appropriate definition of each. 
A - dollar value of advances held by the S & L. 
B - dollar value of bonds held in the household's portfolio. 
g 
D - gross debt accumulated during the period, the gross flow of 
mortgage credit demanded by the household sector. 
E - dollar value of equities held in the household's portfolio. 
F - fixed cost of operating the S & L. 
G - dollar value of government securities held by the S & L. 
H - dollar value of housing held in the household's portfolio, 
K - dollar value of the asset portfolio held by the household. 
L(s) - stock of debt held by the household. 
M - stock of mortgages outstanding to the S & L. 
MB - monetary base. 
N - gross flow of mortgage credit supplied by the S & L. 
- net worth of the household. 
R - net receipts on the individual's portfolio. 




This is the conventional mortgage credit for single-family owner-
occupied homes. Such a data series is not available, therefore, the total 
flow of mortgage credit from S &L's for home purchases was used as a proxy. 
^^The net worth variable includes mortgages but does not include the 
real asset of housing. Only financial assets are considered. 
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R - undistributed profits of the S & L. 
u 
S - dollar value of savings held in the household's portfolio. 
- dollar value of savings deposited at the S & L. 
W - wages and salaries of the household. 
c - cost-of-credit. d 
• i^ - average cost of funds available to the S & L. 
i^ - interest rate on Federal Home Loan Bank advances. 
ig - interest rate on government securities. 
i - interest rate on conventional mortgage credit extended by S & L's. 
ig - interest rate on savings deposits at S & L's. 
r - rate of discount (the yield rate on government 3-month bills), 
r^ - yield rate on bonds. 
r^* - implicit rate of return on bonds (r^ + r). 
r, - discount rate at the Fed. 
a 
r^ - yield rate on equities. 
r^* - implicit rate of return on equities (r^ + r). 
r^^^ - yield rate on housing. 
r^* - implicit rate of return on housing r^ - arC^ + ryC^ + (l-(y)r . 
r^ - yield rate on savings. 
r^* - implicit rate of return on savings (r^ + r). 
• dx 
X=^ - continuous change in the variable over time. 
Q, - loan-to-value ratio on conventional mortgages. 
The yield rate on housing was computed as the percentage distribu­
tion of personal consunq>tion expenditures to housing services plus the 
rate of change in prices of houses. 
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SQ - portion of liquidity reserves held in the form of cash. 
- legal constraint on the amount of advances a S & L may obtain from 
the FHLB system. 
6 - portion of savings held in the form of liquidity reserves. 
9 - portion of past debt repaid during the period. 
A - used to illustrate a discrete change in the variable. 
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XII. APPENDIX: CALCULUS OF VARIATIfflîS 
The calculus of variations is used to a large extent in developing 
the model of the mortgage credit market. To clarify the procedure used, 
elements of the calculus of variations are presented below. 
Consider t'ae following problem. Maximize (or minimize) the integral: 
^1 
u = I f(t, X, x) dt, 
where we denote x = dx/dt and require that x(t^) = a^ xCt^) = b, a and b 
given constants. 
We consider now a variation in the function "f", denoted by "6f". 
We have evidently 
H «== + M = S fi s 
where 6x and 6x are variations of x and x. 
Then the variation of the integral is 
t2 tg ^2 
-= Ijif «==] dt +1 { ^ s "=='} 
Now consider 
-J {ft [M «4 ' i t U  '") " it • #]«" 
° s'il) «*+11 & "M 
« 
where we have used the fact that the derivative of the indefinite integral 
is the expression under the integral sign as well as the rule of finding 




J {Il s »'=)} " M -1 {dt m) «4 
So '"2 
4 {M /t «*>} ° [ ë " I {âjll) «4 "• 
Hence the variation of the integral can be written 
to ^2 , 
j- 6xdt, 5 u = [ | | 6 X]^  + 1  { ^ " 4  Sf dx 
We note that since x (t^) = a and x (t^) = b are given the first term on 
the right is zero. Apart frcnn this condition fix is arbitrary. Hence 
for the expression under the integral to be zero, we derive the Euler 
equation: 
M . i if . 0. 
9x dt ÔX 
which is a necessary condition for a minimum or maximum of our integral. 
